word 'witness'. The narrowest view restricts 'witness' to someone who actually takes the stand and testifies at the defendant's criminal trial. This would assure the defendant the right to confront those who actually testify, but would leave all outof-court (i.e. hearsay) statements beyond that scope of the clause, regulated solely by the rules of evidence governing hearsay. The broadest view is that the term 'witness' applies to anyone whose statement is offered against the defendant; the effect would be to preclude the prosecutor from introducing any hearsay evidence at all, unless the declarant actually testifies at trial-a view the United States Supreme Court has 'long rejected as unintended and too extreme'. 3 The middle view is that in addition to in-court testimony, the clause applies to some, but not all, hearsay evidence. American courts have always understood this middle approach to be the correct one. 4 The question, of course, is how to define which hearsay statements are subject to the clause, and which are not.
The 'trustworthiness' approach
In 1980, in Ohio v Roberts, 5 the United States Supreme Court, reasoning that the underlying goal of the Confrontation Clause was to safeguard against the use of untrustworthy evidence, held that a prosecutor could introduce a hearsay statement, without also calling the declarant as a witness, so long as the statement has sufficient 'indicia of reliability'. 6 There were two ways to establish reliability. One was to show that the statement came within a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception. In various decisions, the Supreme Court has stated that the following exceptions had 'firm roots': the exceptions for business and public records; 7 testimony at a prior proceeding at which the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the declarant; Precisely how the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement should be assessed for trustworthiness, however, proved to be a question of some difficulty. Federal and state court opinions can be found citing almost any circumstance as indicia of trustworthiness-or of its absence. The only constant in this area of the law was confusion.
Crawford v Washington
In Crawford v Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation by the police, which incriminated another suspect, could be admitted against the latter over Confrontation Clause objections. Although such statements are presumptively untrustworthy, because the suspect has a powerful motive to incriminate others (whether they are guilty or not) to curry favour with the authorities, courts nevertheless frequently concluded that they were sufficiently trustworthy, and admitted them.
(a) The facts In the summer of 1999, a man named Kenneth Lee allegedly attempted to rape Sylvia Crawford. She told her husband Michael. Michael and Sylvia went to Lee's apartment to confront him; a fight broke out; Michael stabbed Lee, and was charged with attempted murder and assault. At trial, Michael claimed Lee had reached for and grabbed a weapon, and he stabbed Lee in self-defence; Lee denied doing anything of the sort. The third person present, Sylvia, never testified, because Michael, invoking the state marital privilege, prevented her from taking the stand. Instead, the prosecutor offered in evidence a recording of Sylvia's statement to the police,' 6 which to some extent corroborated Lee's denial that he had not reached for or grabbed a weapon before Michael stabbed him.
The defendant objected that the statement was inadmissible hearsay and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The prosecutor persuaded the trial judge that Sylvia's statement came within the state hearsay exception for statements against penal interest,' 7 thus overcoming the defendant's hearsay objection, and that her statement had sufficient 'guarantees of trustworthiness' to overcome the Confrontation Clause objection. The jury convicted Michael of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, concluding, after applying a nine-factor test, that Sylvia's statement was insufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The Washington Supreme Court in turn reversed the Court ofAppeals and reinstated the conviction, concluding that, because Sylvia's statement was 'virtually identical to' Michael's own statement, 'it maybe deemed reliable"'-a curious basis on which to rule, given that at the trial, the prosecutor described the difference between the two statements as 'damning evidence' that 'completely refutes [petitioner's] claim of self-defense'.
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The United States Supreme Court, by a 7:2 vote, 2 0 reversed. Justice Antonin Scalia, who had dissented or concurred separately in nearly every Supreme Court Confrontation Clause decision since hejoined the court in 1985, wrote the sevenJustice majority opinion.
(b) Rejection of the trustworthiness' approach
Justice Scalia presented persuasive evidence that the Confrontation Clause was included in the Bill of Rights to preserve the 'common law tradition ... of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing', 21 and to prevent the new American government from adopting the European civil-law practice that allowed ex parte witness statements, taken byjustices of the peace or other officers, to be introduced at trial without requiring the declarant to appear and be cross-examined-a practice which, Justice Scalia noted, England had for a time adopted, particularly in 'the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries', the best known being the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 for treason.
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Based on this history, Justice Scalia, who is well known as the member of the court who most consistently advocates a literal reading of the text of the Constitution, insisted that the clause was not merely intended as a procedural device to assure against unreliable evidence (i.e. a device which could therefore be ignored as long as the underlying purpose-trustworthy evidence-was satisfied). Rather, its purpose was precisely to secure the procedural right it explicitly guaranteed: a prosecutor could offer the testimony of a 'witness' only by bringing that witness into the courtroom for the defendant to confront and cross-examine. Justice Scalia's majority opinion disdainfully dismissed the Roberts 'trustworthiness' approach as invalid historically, inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause, impossible to apply objectively, and therefore affording excessive discretion to judges in direct violation of a constitutional right. He pointed out, scathingly, that under the 'trustworthiness' approach, lower courts frequently admitted against a defendant a hearsay declarant's grand jury testimony or guilty plea allocution-precisely the sort of deposition testimony by a witness who was absent from trial that the clause was designed to prohibit.
(c) 'Testimonial' statements Because 'the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use ofex parte examinations as evidence against the accused', Justice Scalia reasoned, the clause clearly applies to some hearsay; but not to all hearsay. Logically, it should apply only to 'testimonial' statements:
This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be admissible under modern hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned them.
The text of the Confrontation Clause ... applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in other words, those who 'bear testimony.' 'Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement. 23 Thus, Crawford holds that the Confrontation Clause clearly applies to all 'testimonial' statements, however that term is defined (about which, more anon).
Applying the logic of Justice Scalia's approach, it seems just as clear that the Confrontation Clause should apply only to 'testimonial' statements; the admissibility ofnon-'testimonial' hearsay should be governed solelyby the rules of evidence, which legislatures or courts may revise as they see fit, unconstrained by the Confrontation Clause. The difficulty, as Justice Scalia acknowledged in Crawford, is that in 1992, in White v Illinois,' the court 'considered [this] proposal, and rejected it'. 5 He continued:
'Although our analysis in this case casts doubt on that holding, we need not definitively resolve whether it survives our decision today, because Sylvia Crawford's statement is testimonial under any definition.'2
Questions answered and unanswered (a) Answered
Crawford therefore provides a definitive answer to the question directly before it-the admissibility, over a Confrontation Clause objection, of a hearsay statement elicited from a declarant during custodial interrogation, when the declarant does not testify at trial. It also provides a definitive answer to related questions: may the state ever introduce, over a Confrontation Clause objection, a hearsay statement elicited from a declarant before a grand jury, or at an on-the-record guilty plea allocution, or a deposition, or any other formal proceeding in which the declarant was not subject to crossexamination by the defendant? Again, the answer is: 'No'. This is because, however 'testimony' is defined at the margins, clearly statements such as these must be considered 'testimonial'. 3. Statements made to private persons, such as employers. DP, the director of personnel, calls employee E into her office and confronts E with evidence that E has been embezzling funds. E breaks down and admits it, adding that he was pressured to do so by F, a bookie, to whom E is heavily in debt. E's statement, if offered in a prosecution ofF (whether for bookmaking or for soliciting E's embezzlement), arguably qualifies under the statementagainst-interest hearsay exception. But if it is classified as 'testimonial', F's Confrontation Clause objection must be sustained.
Dying declarations.
Such statements pose a problem, Justice Scalia acknowledged in Crawford, particularly if such a statement is made to a police officer. A statement made by someone convinced he is about to die, naming the person responsible for his impending death, certainly seems to be '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact' (the early 19th century definition of 'testimony' that Justice Scalia cited in his opinion). Yet the Supreme Court had exempted dying declarations from the Confrontation Clause in the
